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The U.S./EC Relationship: Friends and Competitors 
by Murray Weidenbaum 
The increasing economic integration of Western Europe resulting from the essential 
completion of the EC 1992 agenda is an appropriate time to consider the problems and 
potentials of the developing economic relationship between the United States and the European 
Community .1 
EC-1992 and Beyond 
This presentation analyzes the U.S. /EC relationship from admittedly an American point 
of view. Let us begin with the ongoing economic unification of Western Europe. To an 
economist, the creation of the single market as it unfolds during the 1990s is essentially a 
positive event, yet one destined to generate winners and losers on both sides of the Atlantic. 
Because the formation of the United States represented in a very real sense the creation of the 
original common market, Americans are basically supportive of the community's efforts. We 
have been so from the outset, going back to the creation of the original European Coal and 
Steel Community, the predecessor to the current European Community. 
However, the business and economic relationships among our nations are bound to 
become more intricate as we both compete in what is increasingly a global marketplace 
involving numerous third- and fourth- parties. It is vital, therefore, that the European 
Community and the United States each develop a better understanding of how to be friends and 
competitors simultaneously during the years ahead. In that spirit, we must acknowledge that, 
from the vantage point of American business firms, the rise of the European Community 
presents both threats and opportunities. 
Murray Weidenbaum holds the Mallinckrodt Distinguished University Professorship and is also 
the Director of the Center for the Study of American Business at Washington University in St. 
Louis. Research was supported by a grant from the William H. Donner Foundation. This 
paper was presented at the conference on "Europe After Maastricht" at Washington University 
on October 1, 1993. 
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The fundamental positive economic factor flowing from developments in the EC is, of 
course, that the 12 countries have been reducing restrictions on business, trade, and labor. 
Many of the goals associated with the creation of a single EC market and the integration of 
commercial, financial, and cross-border markets were met with the implementation of the EC 
1992 program, which in large measure went into effect at the beginning of 1993. Despite some 
gaps in implementation, people as well as goods and investments are now able to move much 
more readily from one of the common market nations to any other. That is bound to make 
Western European businesses more efficient as they achieve greater economies of scale and as 
standardization replaces 12 varieties of many products and services. The participation of the 
EC as a single entity representing its member states in the multinational GATT tariff 
negotiations is another important step in the integration process. 
However, the big negative - from the viewpoint of other nations as well as the EC 's 
own consumers - is that the trade wall around the EC is not coming down. In the words of 
the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, "Not only did formation of the EC result in a reduction 
in restrictions on trade between members, it began the process of setting common trade 
restrictions against nonmembers. "2 The contrast between these two very different movements 
is quite striking. 
Actually, the EC is toughening its external barriers to commerce. Enlightened 
economists are not supposed to use pejorative terms such as Fortress Europa, so let us cite 
some numbers instead. In 1960, more than 60 percent of the foreign trade of the 12 EC 
members was outside of the EC. In 1992, 61 percent of their trade remained in the EC.3 This 
is a complete reversal. 
The current ratio is bound to rise further for two reasons. The first is the increasing 
economic integration of the EC-12. The second force moving in the same direction is the six 
countries in the European Free Trade Association (EFT A) who are joining in a formal trade 
association with the Community to form a European Economic Area. Those six are Austria, 
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Finland, Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, and Sweden. For the time being, Switzerland 
rejected participating via a national referendum. 
Complying with the terms of the European Economic Area will anticipate 
approximately two-thirds of the adjustments in national laws necessary for full EC membership. 
The trade linkages are already very strong. Austria, for example, purchases 69 percent of its 
imports from the EC nations which, in turn, buy 65 percent of its exports.4 
Our friends in Brussels tell Americans not to worry about these developments, and that 
the EC 's trade restrictions, such as reciprocity and domestic content rules, are aimed at Japan. 
However, we do not know how good their aim is. The same restrictions that affect Japan can 
keep out goods produced in the United States, whether by domestically owned firms or by 
factories in North America which are transplanted from Asia. Moreover, if the products of 
Asian rim countries are kept out of Europe, the Western Hemisphere is their major alternate 
market. So, in the interconnected global economy which now exists, Americans have a vital 
interest in the maintenance of open trading patterns around the world. EC purchasers, whether 
family consumers or industrial buyers, likely have very similar interests. 
The impacts of greater EC economic unification will surely be uneven, as is expected 
of any dynamic process. The most likely winners will include the stronger European 
companies with high labor skills and high-tech production capabilities. They will be enjoying 
the benefits of both economies of scale and growing domestic markets. These firms also bring 
a special understanding of European needs, capabilities, and cultures. Many of these 
enterprises should emerge larger and stronger than ever. 
In contrast, losers from greater EC economic unification may well include high-cost 
European companies that have been sheltered within their own national markets. Some of these 
more tradition-bound firms will be hurt by new continent-wide competition. The economically 
backward areas- the mezzogiornos- may fall further behind. Of course, not all barriers will 
be down. Each member nation continues to possess individual values, needs, cultures, 
language - and tax systems. No matter what changes the EC makes, the French are not going 
4 
to make a stampede for German wine. The British will still want cars with steering wheels on 
the "wrong" side. 
Likely winners will also include many strong U.S. firms with an established presence 
in Western Europe. The implications of that presence, it turns out, are ambivalent. The 
overwhelming majority of goods sold in the EC by American multinational firms is produced in 
the EC by European workers. Only a small fraction of the products sold by American 
multinationals in the EC is made in the United States and then shipped to Europe for sale by 
their local subsidiaries. 5 
The rationale for American firms favoring direct investment in Europe over exports 
from the United States was made clear by a representative of Pfizer, the American 
pharmaceutical firm: 
Pflzer does not have a choice about whether to manufacture in the European 
Community or not. If we are going to sell in Europe, we have to manufacture there. 6 
Quite a few U.S. -based companies have encountered similar experiences. However, 
once established in Western Europe, these enterprises have some special advantages. These 
high-tech, well-capitalized companies are accustomed to competing on a continent-wide basis. 
They can use one EC country as a base to sell to the other eleven. General Motors and Ford 
currently have more Europe-wide strength than such European automakers as Volkswagen, 
Fiat, Peugeot, and Renault. The same holds true for computer manufacturers such as IBM, 
Digital Equipment, Unisys, and Hewlett Packard compared to their European counterparts. 
On the other side of the ledger, quite a few U.S. firms are likely to be losers from the 
creation of the single European market. They will fmd it more difficult to export to Western 
Europe. Looking beyond the initial adjustment period, U.S. exports to the EC are estimated to 
be 2-3 percent lower than they would be in the absence of European integration.7 U.S.-based 
companies also will face tougher competition from the stronger EC businesses in their domestic 
markets. The expected losers will include many provincial American companies who have not 
yet awakened to developments across the Atlantic. 
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On balance, there is a positive thrust to these changes in the economic relationship 
between the European Community and the United States. From the viewpoint of the United 
States, Western Europe now presents a potential market for a wide range of products and 
services far greater than most Americans appreciate - and the benefits should flow in both 
directions. The EC is the largest customer of U.S. products and, at least until the most recent 
period, its imports from the United States exceed its exports to the United States in most recent 
years. Here are a few examples of the ways in which U.S. and EC companies are developing 
closer business relationships: 
• Ford has agreements with Cosworth in the United Kingdom and Porsche in 
Germany for the design and development of car engines used in the models 
it produces in Europe. 
• IBM purchased minority equity stakes in more than 100 software and 
computer service companies in Western Europe between 1990 and 1992. 
• Some models of Boeing commercial jet transports use engines made by the 
United Kingdom's Rolls-Royce, especially for European airlines. For its 
new 777, Boeing has entered into partnerships with Italy's Alenia to produce 
the outboard wing flaps and with General Electric of Britain for the primary 
flight computers. 
• Otis' new elevator, the Elevonic 411, uses electronics designed by its 
Germany subsidiary, door systems made by its French branch, and small-
geared components produced by its Spanish division. 
• Unisys is simultaneously a customer of, and a supplier to, Switzerland's 
BASF, the Netherlands' Philips, and Germany's Siemens - and also 
competes with each of these Western European electronics giants. 
• Digital Equipment Corporation and Italy's Olivetti & Co. jointly fund and 
share the results from Olivetti's research laboratory in Cambridge, England. 
• General Electric and Pratt & Whitney are cooperating with Rolls-Royce and 
France's SNECMA to develop quieter, more economical, and cleaner-
burning aircraft engines. 
• McDonnell Douglas is working on development of a new radar-equipped 
version of the Harrier II (a vertical take-off and landing aircraft) jointly with 
Alenia, British Aerospace, and CASA of Spain. 
• Pacific Telesis is a 26 percent participant in a joint venture led by 
Mannesmann to provide mobile telephone service in Germany. The 
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American company also holds a 23 percent stake in Telecel, an international 
consortium building a cellular phone system in Portugal. 
Not all developments in the EC have been positive, even from a European viewpoint. 
Considerable concern has been aroused by the failure of the EC-12 to move more rapidly in 
approving and carrying out the Maastricht agreement. In retrospect, the early rush to monetary 
union was faster than could be reasonably sustained. Progress surely will be more cautious in 
the years ahead but some positive movement may well continue. Individually, many market-
oriented economists sympathize with the reluctance of the citizenry to increase the already 
substantial power of the EC bureaucracy and of central bankers. 
The simultaneous failure of Western Europe to take a forceful stand on the contentious 
Bosnia issue also has contributed to a feeling of unease in assessing future progress in the 
Community. However, these political setbacks should not deflect from the genuine 
accomplishments made in integrating the production, trade, and financial markets of Western 
Europe. 
Moreover, the EC is a dynamic and not a static concept. The Community started with 
six member nations and gradually doubled that number. Twelve will not be the end of the line. 
Many other European nations are seeking admission, aside from the special case of East 
Germany, which already has been unified with West Germany. As outsiders, we can only 
speculate that the applications of Sweden, Finland, and Norway will be approved fairly 
expeditiously. Denmark's existing membership is a constant reminder to the other 
Scandinavian nations of the benefits of Community membership. 
Austria's entrance into the EC would be especially strategic, in view of Vienna being a 
major gateway to Eastern Europe. The Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland already have 
each signed preliminary protocols with the EC. It is likely that their relationship, at least 
initially, will be that of associate members. Slovakia may be a fourth member of that category 
and perhaps ultimately joined by one or more of the newly independent Baltic republics. 
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Surely, if the Eastern European nations can get their political and economic acts together, they 
could become low-cost suppliers to Western Europe- or competitors- or both. 
Now consider the impact of the EC going from 12 members to 15 or 20 or more. 
Adding together all those gross domestic products shows that, later in the 1990s, Western (and 
Central) Europe will become the world's largest consolidated marketplace and, conceivably, 
the center of gravity once again of the international economy. That, in turn, requires us to 
analyze, albeit briefly, the key trends in the rest of the international economy. 
The Rise of the Other Regional Groupings 
The Asian rim economies are growing rapidly and now constitute a very large regional 
concentration of economic resources. They are also growing together, although not in a formal 
structure such as EC or EFTA. An examination of the substantial flows of investment from 
within the Asian rim - especially from Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea - to the newer 
industrialized nations in the area such as Thailand, Malaysia, and Indonesia is instructive. 
Most of their investment capital comes, not from Europe or North America, but from Asia 
itself. Not too surprisingly, the development of a unified trading area is now taking place in 
that part of the world. In some cases- notably Malaysia and Indonesia- Japan has become 
their leading trade partner, for exports as well as imports. By 1995, it is likely that Japan will 
provide the largest market for the exports and perhaps also the imports of most of the Asian 
rim nations. 
The other more advanced economies in the Pacific rim - notably South Korea, 
Taiwan, and Hong Kong - are also large providers of investment capital and have become key 
trading partners for the less economically advanced nations in this region. For example, Hong 
Kong and the neighboring Chinese province of Guangdong have generated a very considerable 
cross flow of investment; 50,000 managers and professionals commute daily from Hong Kong 
to Guangdong. Most of the actual manufacturing activity for Hong Kong-based industries is 
now performed on the mainland. In fact, what some observers call the greater "Hong Kong 
8 
enclave" enjoys a gross domestic product approximately that of France and it is growing more 
rapidly.8 
Economists are not especially enamored of inward-looking regional trading blocs. 
Thus, American economists can describe the likely extension of the U.S.-Canadian Free Trade 
Agreement to include Mexico (NAFTA} as essentially an inevitable response on our part to the 
market consolidations that are proceeding so swiftly both in Western Europe and in East Asia. 
Surely, it is important to note that, in the case of the EC as well as NAFT A, this process is 
essentially a positive one, focusing on reducing barriers to commerce. 
Important questions then arise: will regionalization improve the relationship between 
the United States and Western Europe or will we go our separate ways? Will regionalization 
reduce or increase the volume of world trade? The first question is very judgmental. The 
second involves data that are very difficult to interpret. On balance, the continued rise in 
regionalization is likely to coincide with the growth in international commerce. However, it 
will not be a simple cause and effect relationship. It is another development- the 
globalization of business- that will pace the growth of world trade. Continual technological 
advance, especially in transportation and communication, will be a far more powerful force 
than any static governmentally imposed restraints. Let us explore these relationships. 
Regionalization Versus Globalization 
It is commonplace to say that France exports wine and Japan sells automobiles to the 
United States and that the United States exports jet airliners to both. In truth, though, nations 
and governments do little more than record, and tax, those cross-border transactions. It is 
private, profit-seeking enterprises that typically engage in international commerce. 
Examining foreign trade from this viewpoint provides new insights. For example, in 
the case of the larger, more industrialized nations, about one-half of what governments call 
foreign trade actually involves cross-border transactions between different parts of the same 
company. That ratio holds true for Western Europe, the United States, and Japan. An 
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increasingly common occurrence is a domestic firm shipping goods to or receiving items from 
an overseas subsidiary - or a foreign firm engaging in similar transactions with its divisions in 
other countries. 
In a traditional sense, all this is foreign commerce. From an economic viewpoint, 
however, these international flows of goods and services are internal transfers within the same 
firm. Perhaps the most telling case was cited by former U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz. 
He tells of a shipping label on integrated circuits made by an American firm, which read: 
"Made in one or more of the following countries: Korea, Hong Kong, Malaysia, Singapore, 
Taiwan, Mauritius, Thailand, Indonesia, Mexico, Philippines. The exact country of origin is 
unknown." 
That is the global enterprise in full swing. This incident also illustrates the degree to 
which businesses are generating an increasingly more global outlook transcending regional 
blocs, no matter how powerful or carefully structured. This broader perspective underlies the 
strategies that transnational enterprises employ to respond effectively not only to increased 
competition, but also to the inhibiting effects of regionalization. 
Here is a rather unusual example of cross-border commerce to illustrate the power of 
technology in shaping the strategies of the global enterprise: The day of the Iraqi invasion, the 
manager of a Kuwaiti bank faxed the bank's records page by page to his office in Bahrain. He 
was forced to stop several times because the gunfire seemed to be coming closer. By day's 
end, however, he had successfully sent by fax all of the bank's key documents. Having moved 
this vital information, the bank opened for business the next day as a Bahraini institution. Thus 
it was not subject to the United States freeze on Kuwaiti assets or to Iraqi control. The bank 
literally was transplanted from one nation to another by technology. 
Technological progress - especially in the fields of communication and transportation 
- makes possible a variety of business innovations that often overcome the obstacles imposed 
by governments. Cross-border joint ventures and strategic alliances have moved from the 
classroom to the boardroom. They are increasingly common in high-technology industries 
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where few companies possess the resources, the technical ability, or the willingness to 
undertake on their own the risk of a costly new venture. Electronics companies in Europe, 
Asia, and the United States engage in joint ventures to develop new products, and co-produce 
existing products. The same firms serve as sources of supply for each other, are customers of 
each other - and compete against each other. 
There is no set pattern. Partially-owned subsidiaries, associated firms, licensing, 
franchising, and correspondent relationships are all increasingly popular ways businesses 
respond to changing threats and opportunities in the global marketplace. lmmunex Corp. , a 
small biotechnology firm in Seattle, Washington, licenses five products for production and sales 
by the giant Swiss firm Roffman-LaRoche. Jiffy Lube, Hertz, Budget Rent-A-Car, Rainbow 
International (a carpet dyeing and cleaning company), and Mailboxes Etc. have franchised 
many European-based firms to provide the type of services they originally designed for 
American customers. 
The insurance services firm Alexander and Alexander maintains correspondent 
relationships with All Risk of Norway and Aegis Insurance Company of Greece. It also owns 
large minority stakes in France's Societe Generale de Courtage d' Assurances and in Ganat 
Alexander of Spain. A major portion of Corning Glass' revenues comes from joint ventures 
with Germany's Siemens, Switzerland's Ciba-Geigy, and the United Kingdom's Plessey.9 
Clearly, technology and business innovation are outpacing traditional political thinking 
about international relations. The standard geopolitical map is out of date compared with the 
emerging map of business and economics. 
An Optimistic Long-Run View 
While private enterprise is increasingly global, government policy nevertheless usually 
remains very parochial. Understandably, voters still care about the jobs in their country, state, 
province, and locality. And politicians are not reluctant to exploit those concerns. However, 
when we examine how the public sector deals with economic issues, it is hard to sustain a 
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feeling of awe. Take the highly visible subject of EC agricultural subsidies. This is a subject 
that has occupied a considerable amount of the time and energy of U.S. and EC trade 
negotiators. Yet, it is useful to examine the operation of those supposedly awesome obstacles 
to commerce. Here is an excerpt from the 79-page book of instructions published by the UK 
Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries, and Food. This section of the manual, which is supposed to 
instruct farmers how to apply for aid under three of the EC's subsidy schemes, has been 
described as one of the livelier passages of the book: 
If you are claiming only Beef Special Premium and/or Suckler Cow Premium and are 
exempted from the stocking density rules, you need not submit an area aid application. 
You are exempt from the stocking density rules if your total number of Livestock Units 
(LUs) is not more than 15. This total is based on any milk quota you hold on April 1, 
1993, sheep on which you have claimed Sheep Annual Premium in 1993, and cattle on 
which you are claiming Beef Special Premium or Suckler Cow Premium in 1993. 
Further details of the calculation of stocking density and LUs are set out in paragraphs 
44 to 57 of the explanatory booklet "CAP Reform in the Beef Sector." You will, 
however, need to submit an area aid application if you wish to claim extensification 
premium (see paragraphs 58 to 61 of "CAP Reform in the Beef Sector").lO 
There is another and ultimately more powerful force that comes into play in 
international commerce: the consumers who vote every day of the week, in dollars, guilders, 
marks, yen, pounds, francs, and lira. That is a compelling reason to end on an upbeat note 
when pondering the future of the international economy in general and of U.S.-EC 
relationships in particular. 
In each of our nations, the same voters, as consumers, buy products and services made 
anywhere in the world. They may vote protectionist, but their daily buying patterns are 
oriented to free trade. Consumers in each of our nations give far more weight to price and 
quality than to the product's country of origin. Without thinking about it, consumers are 
adapting to the global economy. After all, if consumers were not open to the global 
marketplace, the pressures on government to restrict international trade would not arise in the 
first place. 
In the years ahead, the combined power of economic incentives and technological 
change will increasingly compel voters and government officials to wake up to the positive 
12 
implications of the global economy. In a basic sense, the mobility of enterprises - of their 
people, capital, and information- is reducing the power of government. Public-sector 
decision makers increasingly are being forced to understand that they now have to become 
internationally competitive in the economic policies they devise. Government programs that 
impose costs without compensating benefits or that reduce wealth substantially in the process of 
redistributing income undermine the competitive positions of their own domestic enterprises. 
The result is either the loss of business to firms located in other nations or the movement of the 
domestic company's resources and activities to more hospitable locations. 
Political scientists and economists have long since understood and every American 
school child is taught that people vote with their feet. They leave regions and nations with 
limited opportunity in favor of those that offer a more attractive future. In this era of 
computers, telephones, and fax machines, enterprises are far more mobile than that. The fear 
of losing economic activity to other parts of the world will surely reshape in fundamental ways 
the domestic political agendas of the coming decade. 
Therefore, despite the difficulties being encountered by governments negotiating at 
GATT, we can be optimistic about future trends of world investment and commerce. Even if 
many of those public-sector barriers remain, the private sector will increasingly learn how to 
overcome them or even just to live with them. Of course, there are costs involved when 
businesses respond to governmental barriers to international business. At times, the costs of 
crossing these borders may be very substantial, especially in the short run. However, in a 
global economy, these barriers become far from absolute. 
Conclusion 
The tension between business and government is not new, but the required adjustments 
may actually reduce the frictions between governments by bringing closer together the people 
and private institutions of each of our nations. The traditional problems of international 
relations are being exacerbated by the rapid rate of social, economic, and technological change 
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around the globe. But, as a result, the real liberalization of international trade and investment 
- and the creation of a truly global marketplace in the years ahead - will be achieved, not 
from changes in government policy, but from the competition among firms in the private sector 
of the various national and regional economies. 
The rapidly changing global marketplace of the 1990s, and likely beyond, will provide 
both threat and opportunity for business firms, governments, and consumers. Invariably, 
developments such as the achievement of the single market will generate both winners and 
losers. The outcomes for specific individuals and organizations will depend in large part on 
their ability to understand and to respond effectively to ever-changing economic and 
technological trends. 
While governments continue to react to the global marketplace with new regional 
associations, businesses will keep on trying to overcome or at least to adjust to these barriers 
and policies in their relentless effort to meet the needs of their customers. 
Looking out toward the twenty-first century, we can readily envision the business firms 
and consumers of both North America and Western Europe becoming tied far more closely 
together than is the case today. Happily, those alliances and other cooperative relationships 
will not be forced by governments. Rather, they will be encouraged by economic opportunities 
and technological possibilities. We indeed will learn how simultaneously to be friends and 
competitors. 
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